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4.1 Introduction
The Asian crises have triggered a debate on how new rules and institu-
tions could increase the resilience of the international monetary system.
Among many proposals, it has been suggested that an international
lender of last resort would be a useful addition. One idea, a distant re-
minder of Keynes’s proposal in Bretton Woods, is to set up an interna-
tional central bank that would issue a global currency (Garten 1998).
Other ideas start from the observation that crisis lending by the interna-
tional community has already evolved toward de facto lending in last re-
sort since the Mexican bailout—a trend that, some argue, should be de-
veloped and institutionalized (Fischer 1999). A report to the U.S.
Congress recently advocated the transformation of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) into a “quasi-lender of last resort” lending at
penalty rates and against good marketable collateral (International Fi-
nancial Institution Advisory Commission [IFIAC] 2000). Others have ar-
gued that the international lending-in-last-resort function should be un-
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The idea that an international lender of last resort (LOLR) could and
should become the linchpin of the global ﬁnancial architecture has been
criticized on diﬀerent grounds. It has been noted, ﬁrst, that an international
LOLR might worsen the moral hazard problem, which, some argue, is one
of the main causes of fragility of the international ﬁnancial system
(Calomiris 1998). Another argument is that although a true international
lender of last resort might be desirable in theory, it has no chance of being
instituted in practice because the institutional changes involved go well be-
yond what the international community is ready to accept (Eichengreen
1999). Some further claim that an international LOLR cannot function
eﬀectively unless it can issue an indeﬁnite amount of its own currency
(Capie 1998), and others argue that the LOLR would need an amount of
hard currencies that, although ﬁnite, is unrealistically large (Eichengreen
1999; Rogoﬀ 1999).
The debate suggests that the notion of an international LOLR is not well
understood, or at least is subject to diﬀerent interpretations. Questions
range from the nature of crises to the arrangements required for the LOLR
to operate.1 This paper proposes a formal framework that may help shed
light on several of these issues.
The question with which this paper is primarily concerned is that of the
size of the international LOLR. Does the international LOLR have to be a
global central bank, or could it function eﬀectively as a fund with limited
and predetermined resources? In the second case, how large should the fund
be? To answer these questions, we build a model of an emerging economy
that is vulnerable to international liquidity crises. An international LOLR
can in principle cope with these crises by providing hard currency to cash-
strapped countries. We scrutinize the size of LOLR interventions that are
required to that eﬀect.
This paper focuses on the eﬀectiveness of an international LOLR in deal-
ing with twin (banking and currency) crisis.2 The need for an international
LOLR stems, in our model, from a currency mismatch in the balance sheet
of the emerging economy’s banking sector. The domestic banking sector
does not hold enough foreign currency assets to cover its short-term foreign
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1. This lack of consensus reﬂects, to some extent, the state of the literature on the lending-
in-last-resort doctrine. Indeed, the dominant genre in this literature seems to be the exegesis—
the spirit and letter of Bagehot’s Lombard Street being invoked to promote various interpreta-
tions of the “classical” doctrine. The more formal (model-based) literature, which is generally
based on variants of the Diamond-Dybvig model, fails to capture many insights of its less for-
mal counterpart. Naturally, the transposition of these debates to the international context
makes things more diﬃcult. See Freixas and Rochet (1997, chap. 7) or Bordo (1990) for reviews
of the main debates on lending in last resort.
2. The role of the international LOLR in connection with sovereign liquidity crises is dis-
cussed by Sachs (1995), Jeanne (2000b), and Kumar, Masson, and Miller (2000).currency liabilities.3 It is vulnerable, as a result, to panics in which short-
term creditors withdraw their credit lines and depositors run on domestic
banks. As in some recent models of twin crises, these panics can be self-
fulﬁlling because of the two-way feedbacks between the depreciation of the
currency and the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets (Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo 1999; Schneider and Tornell 2000).
The question, then, is how large the international LOLR should be to re-
move the bad equilibrium. We ﬁnd that the required size of the international
LOLR crucially depends on how its resources are used. We compare two
approaches, which correspond to the distinction—originally made by
Goodfriend and King (1988) in a domestic context—between “lending-in-
last-resort as an input in monetary policy” and “lending-in-last-resort as an
input in banking policy.” In the former approach, the international LOLR
injects its resources into the ﬁnancial market, directly or through the do-
mestic monetary authorities. In the second approach, the resources of the
international LOLR are used to back domestic banking safety nets, such as
discount-window lending policy by the central bank or a government guar-
antee of banks’ foreign currency liabilities. The two approaches have the fol-
lowing implications for the size of the international LOLR.
• If the resources of the international LOLR are injected into the mar-
ket, lending in last resort has to be carried out by the issuer of the in-
ternational currency (the U.S. Federal Reserve). The panic equilibrium
is not removed by a limited fund, even a very large one.
• The lending-in-last-resort function can be eﬀectively carried out by a
limited fund if its resources are used to back domestic banking safety
nets. Then the international LOLR resources do not need to be larger
than the liquidity gap in the domestic banking sector, that is, the diﬀer-
ence between the domestic banking sector’s short-term foreign cur-
rency liabilities and its foreign currency liquid assets.
Clearly, the second approach seems more practical than the ﬁrst one. We
argue, however, that it raises knotty agency problems that seem diﬃcult
toaddress under the current international ﬁnancial architecture. In the sec-
ond approach, the international LOLR would have to be an “International
Banking Fund” closely integrated with the domestic systems of ﬁnancial
safety nets and supervision in emerging economies. It would have to assume
a signiﬁcant role in supervising domestic banking sectors. We do not see
such an evolution as likely, at least in the foreseeable future. Nations remain
jealous of their prerogatives in the regulation and supervision of their bank-
ing sectors, and there seems to be little political appetite for a globally inte-
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3. If the assets and liabilities of domestic banks were denominated in the domestic currency,
the domestic authorities would not need any external assistance to lend in last resort (Chang
and Velasco 2000; Goodhart and Huang, 2000). There would be no need for an international
lender of last resort.grated system with the IMF, the BIS, or any new institution at its center
(Eichengreen 1999; Giannini 2002).
As a by-product, our model yields interesting insights on monetary policy
and exchange rate regimes in emerging economies. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the country’s vulnerability to twin crises is the same under a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime as under a ﬁxed peg. The reason is that the scope oﬀered by ex-
change rate ﬂexibility is largely illusory in a twin crisis. A ﬂoating exchange
rate regime allows the domestic monetary authorities to set lower interest
rates, but the associated exchange rate depreciation is no less destabilizing
for the domestic ﬁnancial sector—when there is a currency mismatch—than
high interest rates.4Indeed, if our analysis has any implications for exchange
rate regimes, it is to suggest the optimality of very hard pegs, or dollariza-
tion. In our model, a credible commitment not to devalue the currency re-
moves the bad equilibrium at no cost to the international community.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents some evidence on
the Asian crises to motivate the model. Section 4.3 presents the model. Sec-
tion 4.4 examines the role of domestic monetary policy, and section 4.5 that
of an international lender of last resort. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Asian Twin Crises: Some Stylized Facts
Although the concomitance of banking and currency crises is not an
original feature of the Asian 1997 crisis,5 it appeared as a very salient one
for market participants at the time. Market analysts generally viewed the
banking crises as the primary determinant of the currency instability and
conditioned their exchange rate forecasts on the prospects of a recovery in
the banking sector (see, e.g., the Financial Time Currency Forecaster 1997–
98). This section presents a few stylized facts on the banking and currency
crises in the four countries most aﬀected by banking instability: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Our main purpose is to motivate the as-
sumptions of the model presented in the following section.
4.2.1 Maturity and Currency Mismatches
The four crisis-hit countries received an exceptionally high level of capi-
tal inﬂows in the period leading up to the crisis. A signiﬁcant fraction of
these inﬂows took the form of short-term credit in foreign currency. Mean-
while, current account deﬁcits were draining the foreign exchange reserves,
leading to the buildup of a large and increasing gap between short-term ex-
ternal debt and the foreign exchange reserves at the central bank (ﬁg. 4.1).
On the eve of the crisis, only Malaysia had enough reserves to cover its
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4. A similar point is made by Bacchetta (2000) and Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000).
See also Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000); Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2000); and
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2000) for recent models of monetary policy with a balance
sheet channel for the exchange rate.



































tshort-term debt to BIS-reporting banks. The international liquidity gap
was especially large in Indonesia, where it exceeded 7 percent of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) at the end of 1996 (table 4.1). A signiﬁcant fraction
of this buildup in short-term external debt reﬂected borrowing by domestic
banks. The foreign liabilities of domestic banks increased markedly in all
countries, most dramatically in Thailand, where they were approaching one
third of GDP on the eve of the crisis (table 4.1).
Most of the external borrowing by banks and corporates was denomi-
nated in foreign currency, and the resulting currency risk was largely un-
hedged. Data limitations make it very diﬃcult to assess the extent to which
the currency risk was assumed directly by banks or passed along to their
borrowers. Although bank regulation typically disallows currency mis-
matches, one of the lessons from the recent crises is that they do occur and
can be sizable. Even when the banks themselves avoid currency mismatches,
ﬁrms that are their customers may carry such a risk on their own books. If
many large ﬁrms fail simultaneously, so will their banks, especially as ma-
turity transformation is a key function of the banking system.
4.2.2 The Bust
The crisis was accompanied by sharp depreciations of the exchange rate
in all countries, a phenomenon that was more pronounced and persistent in
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Table 4.1 The Asian Twin Crises
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Foreign exchange reserves 
(end of 1996) 7.8 6.4 26.0 20.5
Short-term debt to 
BIS-reporting banks 
(end of 1996) 15.0 12.0 11.2 25.1
Foreign liabilities of 
domestic banks 
(end of 1996) 5.6 8.7 11.2 27.1
Peak-to-trough decline in  5.3 3.4 16.5 7.3
reserves (6/97–2/98) (7/97–12/97) (3/97–1/98) (1/97–8/97)
Decline in domestic banks’  –0.8 3.2 4.1 2.4
foreign liabilities (6/97–2/98) (7/97–12/97) (3/97–1/98) (1/97–8/97)
Liquidity support to ﬁnancial 
institutions (6/97–6/99) 31.9 6.9 13.8 22.5
IMF-supported packages 
(disbursement) 8.8 6.0 — 7.9
Bank closures (percentage points 
of total banking assets) 18.0 15.0 0.0 13.0
Memorandum items
Total bank assets (1996) 90.0 300.0 300.0 190.0
1996 GDP (US$ billions) 227.4 520.2 100.7 181.9
Note: The variables are expressed in percentage points of 1996 GDP, except when speciﬁed
otherwise.Indonesia than elsewhere (ﬁg. 4.2). Indonesia was also exceptional in the
level at which it raised its interest rate, a diﬀerence that reﬂected more the
burst of inﬂation that followed the depreciation than an aggressive defense
of the currency (ﬁg. 4.3). By contrast, the interest rates in Malaysia seem to
have been somewhat insulated from exchange rate developments by capital
controls.
Simultaneously, the banking problems that had started to surface before
the crisis took a sudden turn for the worse under the joint pressure of high
interest rates, a depreciated currency, and a general loss of conﬁdence. The
currency depreciation had an adverse eﬀect on the solvency of banks and
ﬁrms because of the currency mismatches in their balance sheets. A large-
scale run by domestic depositors was observed in Indonesia, where, by mid-
December 1997, 154 banks representing half of the total assets of the sys-
tem had faced a signiﬁcant erosion of their deposit base (Lindgren et al.
1999). The other countries had to cope with a similar pressure coming from
short-term creditors, especially foreign banks in Korea.
Although the withdrawal of foreign credit lines certainly exercised a
drain on the foreign exchange reserves, it does not seem to have been in gen-
eral the primary cause of capital outﬂows. Table 4.1 reports peak-to-trough
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Fig. 4.2 Exchange rates (1990–2000)
Fig. 4.3 Money market interest rateschanges in foreign exchange reserves, as well as the change in the foreign li-
abilities of domestic banks at the time of the crisis. With the exception of
Korea, the drop in reserves was driven much more by speculative capital
outﬂows than by the repayment of banks’ foreign debt. On average (ex-
cluding Korea), the fall in reserves was six times as large as the decline in
banks’ foreign liabilities. In other words, out of each dollar ﬂowing out of
these economies, less than fourteen cents were used to repay the foreign li-
abilities of domestic banks. The rest was capital ﬂight caused by domestic
and foreign residents’ shifting their portfolio toward foreign assets and by
speculation against the domestic currency.
The four countries suﬀered large falls in output (see f ﬁg. 4.4) and there is
evidence that the banking problems contributed to the slumps. The impor-
tance of banks in ﬁnancial intermediation had increased markedly in the
period leading up to the crisis.6 As the crisis developed, the most insolvent
banks were closed, and the others saw their ability to lend curtailed by the
withdrawal of short-term credit lines. Banking problems were associated
with a severe decline in real credit (Lindgren et al. 1999). Although it is del-
icate, as always, to disentangle the respective contributions of demand and
supply in the credit crunch, some studies have found evidence that it was in
part supply driven (Ghosh and Ghosh 1999; Ding, Domaç, and Ferri 1998).
4.2.3 Policy Responses
Countries responded to the crisis on several fronts. We brieﬂy review the
emergency measures in macro and banking policies, leaving aside the more
structural policies that were also initiated at the time of the crisis.
The ﬁrst and most immediate decision in a currency crisis is the choice
between increasing the interest rate in order to defend the currency and let-
ting the exchange rate go. Our four countries did both to various extents, in
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Fig. 4.4 Real GDP (1991   100)
6. Total commercial bank and near-bank assets grew from between 50 and 100 percent of
GDP in 1992 to between 150 and 200 percent of GDP at the end of 1996 (see table 4.1). As a
comparison, deposit money banks held assets equal to 80 percent of GDP in the United States.part as the reﬂection of a dilemma in which the monetary authorities were
caught. On the one hand, there were limits to which the interest rate could
be raised, given the fragile state of the banking and corporate sectors. On
the other hand, letting the currency depreciate also had adverse eﬀects be-
cause of the currency mismatch in the balance sheets of banks and ﬁrms.
The limited scope oﬀered by monetary policy led the authorities to rely
on policies that were more directly targeted at banks. In all four countries
central banks provided liquidity to ﬁnancial institutions under various
emergency lending and LOLR facilities. The amounts were especially large
in Indonesia and Thailand, where they exceeded 20 percent of GDP (table
4.1). This liquidity support was provided in domestic currency except in Ko-
rea, where it was primarily in U.S. dollars. To the extent that its impact on
the monetary base was sterilized, however, the liquidity support provoked
the same reserves losses irrespective of the currency in which it was pro-
vided.7
The provision of emergency liquidity was enhanced by various forms of
government guarantees of banks’ liabilities. None of the four countries had
a formal insurance scheme on bank deposits at the beginning of the crisis,
so the guarantees had to be introduced under the pressure of events. As the
severity of the crisis became apparent and the introduction of more limited
guarantees failed to restore conﬁdence, the four countries ended up pro-
viding blanket guarantees for all depositors and most creditors (Lindgren
et al. 1999). The guarantees did not always succeed in stemming capital out-
ﬂows, however, possibly because of uncertainty about the government’s
ability to honor them. In Korea, for example, the guarantee on foreign debt
was not suﬃcient to convince short-term foreign creditors to roll over their
credit lines. This was followed by an eﬀort to coordinate creditors and was
resolved by voluntary debt restructuring. In all four countries, the guaran-
tees were announced to be temporary and meant to maintain public conﬁ-
dence during the period of restructuring.
These policies were backed by large rescue packages arranged under the
auspices of the IMF, with the notable exception of Malaysia. Interestingly,
the size of these packages was of the same order of magnitude as—and in
fact slightly larger than—the liquidity gap before the crisis (table 4.1).
Malaysia instead chose to introduce drastic capital controls.
4.3 Model
One feature of twin crises that the Asian experience illustrates very well
is the mutually self-reinforcing nature of banking and currency fragilities.
As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) put it, “Financial-sector problems
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7. Sterilization was largely eﬀective in Korea and Thailand, but not in Indonesia and
Malaysia.undermine the currency. Devaluations, in turn, aggravate the existing
banking-sector problems and create new ones. These adverse feedback
mechanisms . . . can be ampliﬁed, as we have seen in several of the recent
Asian crises, by banks’ inadequate hedging of foreign-exchange risk.”
We present a model (ﬁg. 4.5) in which these negative feedback eﬀects are
linked together in the following vicious spiral: The currency depreciation
triggers bank runs because of a currency mismatch in the balance sheets
of domestic banks. Banking problems in turn depress domestic supply by
inducing a credit crunch. Finally, the decline in domestic supply weakens
the currency, as the domestic authorities attempt to boost output by a de-
preciation. This closes the circle.
In our model this vicious circle goes beyond making twin crises simply
persistent or diﬃcult to manage: it makes them self-fulﬁlling. We would like
to emphasize, however, that we do not view this paper as a contribution to
the debate on whether twin crises are self-fulﬁlling in the real world. The pur-
pose of this paper is notto convince the reader that they were, in Asia or else-
where. It is to study the feasibility of an international LOLR. It makes sense
to look at this question in the context of a model with self-fulﬁlling bank
runs, which is the problem that a LOLR is supposed to solve in theory.
4.3.1 The Linkage from the Currency Depreciation to Bank Runs
We consider a two-period model of an open emerging economy (t 1, 2).
The agents are the domestic private banks, their depositors, and the do-
mestic central bank. For the sake of brevity and couleur locale we call the
domestic and foreign currencies peso and dollar respectively. We denote by
St the price of one peso in terms of dollars at time t. An increase in St thus
corresponds to an appreciation of the peso.
The peso/dollar exchange rate satisﬁes uncovered interest parity (UIP):







∗   Se
2,
where Se
2is the expected exchange rate, and iand i∗are respectively the peso
and dollar riskless interest rates in period 1.
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Fig. 4.5 The vicious spiralDomestic banks have deposits and income streams denominated in dol-
lars and pesos. The currency composition of banks’ assets and liabilities is
inherited from an earlier time, in which some banks found it optimal to bor-
row or lend in dollars or for some reason could not borrow in pesos.8It does
not seriously weaken our analysis to take the structure of banks’ balance
sheets as given, because we focus here on the policy measures at the time of
the crisis, after the currency and maturity mismatches have built up.9 We
denote by D(j) and D∗(j) the quantities of peso and dollar deposits at bank
j, and by Rt(j) and Rt ∗(j) its peso-denominated and dollar-denominated in-
come streams in period t.
Deposits are repayable on demand, and demand is served sequentially, as
in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model of bank runs. Each bank has a con-
tinuum of atomistic depositors who decide at t   1 whether or not to with-
draw their deposits. The withdrawing depositors are randomly allocated in
a queue that determines the order in which they are served. The bank repays
depositors by selling its assets for pesos or dollars in the market. If the bank
does not have enough assets to repay all the withdrawing depositors in pe-
riod 1, the depositors at the end of the queue, and those who have not joined
the queue, receive nothing. In the opposite case, the assets that remain in
the possession of the bank at the end of period 1 are sold in period 2 to re-
pay the remaining depositors—those who have not withdrawn in period 1.
Deposits are interest bearing and yield the riskless interest rate correspon-
ding to their currency of denomination. The holder of one dollar (peso) of
deposit at time 1 is entitled to withdraw 1   i∗ (1   i) dollars (pesos) at
time 2.
We assume that bank assets are liquid in the sense that they can be sold
costlessly on a perfectly competitive market at their present discounted
value. This assumption is important insofar as it rules out bank runs à la Di-
amond and Dybvig, which are caused by the illiquidity of bank assets.10
Bank j is solvent if, and only if, the present value of its income streams ex-
ceeds the value of its deposits, that is:
(2) D∗(j)   S1D(j)   R∗
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8. Chang and Velasco (2000) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) endogenize the maturity mis-
match in open-economy versions of the Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999) and Schneider and Tornell (2000) endogenize the currency
mismatch as the result of a government guarantee on foreign currency liabilities, whereas in
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) it is the result of domestic ﬁnancial underdevelopment.
9. Of course it would be essential to endogenize the currency mismatch if we wanted to un-
derstand how policy measures can prevent its emergence ex ante (Jeanne, 2000c).
10. In theory, the beneﬁt of banking intermediation should be linked to the illiquidity of
bank assets. Assuming that bank assets are sold at a discount relative to their present value
would not change the thrust of our results, and it is interesting to see that in fact we do not need
this assumption. The role played by the illiquidity assumption in the bank run literature is
played here by a state-conditional depreciation of the domestic currency.If this solvency condition is satisﬁed, the bank can repay all its depositors
irrespective of the date at which they withdraw, and depositors have no
(strict) incentives to withdraw early. If this condition is not satisﬁed, then all
depositors run on the bank at period 1. Some depositors will have to take a
loss, and each depositor minimizes the likelihood of being one of them by
withdrawing his deposits early. Note that, by contrast with the Diamond-
Dybvig model, the equilibrium is unique at the level of an individual bank.
For a given balance sheet structure, the occurrence of a run is determined
by interest and exchange rates, variables that are exogenous to the actions
of the bank’s depositors (the bank being very small).
In order to simplify the exposition we shall consider an extreme case of
currency and maturity mismatch: all the deposits are denominated in dol-
lars, and banks receive only one income stream, which is denominated in
pesos and arrives in period 2. In terms of the variables of our model, this
corresponds to the case in which R∗
1, R∗
2, R1and Dare equal to zero. The as-
sumption that R∗
1and R∗
2are equal to zero does not restrict the generality of
the analysis, and it is made simply to alleviate the algebra. The case in which
R1 and D are diﬀerent from zero is analyzed in the appendix. It has inter-
esting implications for domestic monetary policy, which we choose not to
discuss here because they are not essential to the core of our argument.
Using the interest parity condition in equation (1) to substitute S1 and i
out of the solvency condition in equation (2), we ﬁnd that bank j is solvent
if and only if





In order to avoid the discontinuity associated with the use of integers, we as-
sume that the set of banks is isomorphic to a continuum of mass 1 and that
the banks’ characteristics are continuously distributed. As equation (3)
makes clear, the set of solvent banks shrinks if the expected peso exchange
rate depreciates (Se
2 goes down). Consequently, the number of bank runs in
period 1, n, is a continuous and decreasing function of the expected ex-
change rate:
(4) n   N(Se
2), N  0
An expected depreciation of the peso reduces the value of bank assets rela-
tive to their liabilities, drawing a larger number of banks into insolvency.
4.3.2 The Reverse Linkage
The linkage from bank runs to exchange rate expectations is in the spirit
of the escape clause or second-generation approach to currency crises
(Jeanne 2000a). It involves the endogenous policy response of the domestic
authorities to the disruption in real activity induced by the bank runs.
100 Olivier Jeanne and Charles WyploszWe assume that period-2 output is given by a standard Phillips curve aug-
mented by a term reﬂecting the real disruption induced by runs on domes-
tic banks in period 1. The law of one price applies, so that the Phillips curve
can be written in terms of the exchange rate:
(5) Y 2   Y     (S2   Se
2)   f(n), f(0)   0, f  0,
Y  is the natural level of output, and n is the number of banks that are sub-
ject to runs in period 1. Bank runs reduce output by inducing a credit
crunch: the banks that are subject to runs are no longer able to provide
loans to borrowers with no easy access to other forms of ﬁnance.11Function
f( ) characterizes how the output loss in period 2 depends on the number
of bank runs in period 1. The output loss is increasing with the number of
runs, presumably in a nonlinear way: for example, one could assume that a
small number of bank runs has no eﬀect on output but that widespread runs
(the truly systemic banking crises) entail large output losses.
The domestic government minimizes the quadratic loss L2   (Y 2 – Y  )2  
 (S2 – S  )2. As in the classical Barro-Gordon setting, the exchange rate term
captures an aversion to changes in the domestic price level (which are equiv-
alent to changes in the exchange rate under the law of one price). We assume
that the domestic government behaves in a discretionary way; that is, it min-
imizes its loss function in period 2, taking period 1 expectations as given.
Using equation (5) to substitute out Y 2 in L2, and minimizing over S2, one
ﬁnds that the period-2 exchange rate is a function of the number of bank
runs and of the expected exchange rate:
(6) S2   
 2  
1
 
 [ S     2Se
2    f(n)]
The expected exchange rate in period 2 is decreasing with the number of
bank runs in period 1, as the authorities attempt to mitigate the eﬀect of the
credit crunch on domestic output with a depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency.
4.3.3 Multiple Equilibria
We look at rational expectations Nash equilibria, in which each deposi-
tor decides whether or not to withdraw in period 1, taking the actions of the
other depositors as given. Under rational expectations, the expected ex-
change rate and its realized level must coincide, because there is no uncer-
tainty in the model. Replacing Se
2 with S2 in equations (4) and (6), we ﬁnd
The International Lender of Last Resort 101
11. Disyatat (2000) presents a model of an open economy in which a depreciation tends to
stimulate output because of a short-run Phillips curve but reduces the domestic banks’ ability
to lend. The credit crunch in his model comes from a reduction in banks’ net worth, not from
runs.that the number of bank runs and the second-period exchange rate are
linked by two relationships:
n   N(S2), (CM)




The currency mismatch (CM) relationship characterizes the linkage from
the exchange rate to the number of bank runs. Its shape is determined by the
currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets: in the absence of mismatch,
the number of bank runs would not depend on the exchange rate. The credit
crunch (CC) relationship characterizes the linkage from bank runs to the
exchange rate. This link arises because the domestic authorities depreciate
the currency in response to a credit crunch.
Figure 4.6 shows the CC and CM curves with the number of bank runs on
the x-axis and the exchange rate on the y-axis. Both curves are downward-
sloping, so that the model generically gives rise to multiple equilibria. In the
case represented in ﬁgure 4.6 there are two stable equilibria, corresponding to
points A and C. In the good equilibrium (point A) the currency is strong and
only the “truly insolvent” banks are subject to runs. In the bad equilibrium
(point C) the currency is expected to depreciate markedly, and all the banks
are subject to runs. The equilibrium corresponding to point B is unstable.12
Note that, although bank runs may be self-fulﬁlling in this model, they
never hit an “illiquid but solvent” bank. There is a perfect coincidence, in
equilibrium, between runs and insolvency. In the bad equilibrium, the
banks that are subject to runs are made insolvent by the pressure on the ex-
change rate. Some of these banks are “truly” or “virtually” solvent, in the
sense that they would be solvent in the good equilibrium. However, it is im-
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Fig. 4.6 Twin-crisis equilibria
12. At point B, the bank runs caused by a slight fall in the expected exchange rate tend to de-
preciate the exchange rate even further, pushing the economy to point C.portant to keep in mind that “true” solvency, understood in this sense, is an
out-of-equilibrium concept.
4.3.4 How Panics Depend on the Fundamentals
The model makes several predictions about the conditions under which
twin crises occur. First, there must be a signiﬁcant currency mismatch in the
balance sheets of domestic banks: the equilibrium is uniquely determined if
banks’ assets and liabilities are denominated in the same currency and, by
continuity, if the two are suﬃciently close. Second, the weight of the ex-
change rate (or price) objective in the authorities’ loss function must be
suﬃciently small. If this weight,  , is large, the bad equilibrium disappears
because bank runs are no longer expected to signiﬁcantly depreciate the
currency.13Finally, self-fulﬁlling twin crises are more likely when the foreign
interest rate, i∗, is high, because this increases the number of insolvent
banks, other things being equal.14
It is not diﬃcult to complicate the model slightly so as to make the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria contingent on other economic variables. For example,
we could introduce a persistence eﬀect in the Phillips curve, replacing equa-
tion (5) with
(7) Y 2   Y     (Y 1   Y  )    (S2   Se
2)   f(n)
The second-period output now depends on its ﬁrst-period level. Conse-
quently, the second-period exchange rate will also depend on the ﬁrst-
period output Y 1, and twin crises can occur only if Y 1 is not too high. These
results are broadly consistent with Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) obser-
vation that twin crises are preceded by recessions or below-normal eco-
nomic growth and tend to occur when U.S. interest rates are high. The con-
tingency of the multiplicity on output is not essential for our discussion,
however, and we use the simpler model.
Whether the economy lands on one or the other of the equilibria may de-
pend on a sunspot variable, which may or not be correlated with the under-
lying fundamentals. As one of us has argued elsewhere, the sunspot should
not be interpreted literally, but rather as a “black box” for the little-
understood phenomena involved in the selection of the equilibrium in the
real world (Jeanne 2000a).15We do not lose much from using this black box
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13. In the limit case in which   is inﬁnite, the CC curve in ﬁgure 4.6 is horizontal, so that
there is one unique equilibrium.
14. Raising i∗ increases the number of insolvent banks for a given exchange rate and shifts
the CM locus to the right. Thus, this could shift the economy from a state in which the CM is
everywhere below CC—so that there is one unique equilibrium with no bank run—to a state
in which the CM and CC curves have multiple intersections.
15. Morris and Shin (1998) present a possible theory for the selection of the equilibrium.
Their approach requires the number of equilibria to depend on the value of some exogenous
hidden fundamental about which market participants receive private signals. It could be ap-
plied to our model by assuming, for example, that market participants do not know the true
value of the domestic government’s aversion to inﬂation,  .in this paper, because we look at policy measures that aim at removing the
multiplicity of equilibria, not measures that aim at favoring the selection of
the good equilibrium.
4.4 The Limits of Monetary Policy
This section presents the implications of the model for domestic mone-
tary policy. We show that domestic monetary policy does not oﬀer the right
tools for dealing with twin crises. This point, which is of independent inter-
est, is also important to justify the intervention of an international LOLR.
If the domestic authorities could deal with twin crises by using monetary
policy, there would be no need for an international LOLR. In addition, the
model has interesting implications for exchange rate regimes, which we
brieﬂy discuss in section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 The Irrelevance of Interest Rates
The most immediate question that policy makers have to solve in the heat
of crises is macroeconomic: what to do with the interest rate? The debates
spurred by the IMF’s policy recommendations in the Asian crisis have seen
the opposition between two views: the view that the interest rate should be
raised, at least for a while, in order to defend the currency, and the view that
it should be kept at a low level to spare the domestic economy. The advo-
cates of the latter view have pointed out that a policy of high interest rate
may be self-destructive to the extent that it aggravates the real problems in
the economy, in particular in the banking sector (Furman and Stiglitz 1998).
The opposite side has emphasized that letting the currency depreciate is
not a viable alternative when there is a currency mismatch in the balance
sheet of banks or firms. Our model is consistent with at least one part of
each view: monetary policy simply does not oﬀer the right tools to deal with
twin crises.
In our model, low or high interest rates are equally ineﬀective against
twin crises. In order to establish this point, it is suﬃcient to recall that the
domestic interest rate, i, was not in the list of variables that determine the
set of equilibria. Hence, if the economy is vulnerable to a self-fulﬁlling twin
crisis, there is nothing that the domestic authorities can do about it by ma-
nipulating the domestic interest rate.
One may dig out the economic intuition behind this result by going back
to the condition for bank solvency, equation (3). The solvency of banks is
determined by one variable: the time-1 dollar price of time-2 pesos, Se
2/(1  
i∗). Under UIP, his price can be decomposed as the product of two terms,
the time-1 peso price of a time-2 peso, and the time-1 exchange rate:















104 Olivier Jeanne and Charles WyploszThe ﬁrst term is decreasing with i, while the second term is increasing with
i. Increasing i, thus, has two opposite eﬀects, which capture the two sides of
the debate mentioned above. On the one hand, raising i undermines banks’
solvency by depressing the peso price of long-term peso assets. On the other
hand, this enhances banks’ solvency by appreciating the domestic currency.
The ﬁrst eﬀect arises because of the maturity mismatch in the balance sheet
of banks, and the second eﬀect because of the currency mismatch. On bal-
ance, the two eﬀects cancel each other out, so that the level of the interest
rate is irrelevant.
The two eﬀects exactlycancel each other out because of the particular as-
sumptions we have made on the currency and maturity structure of banks’
balance sheets—that bank deposits are denominated in dollars, and that
their receipts are given in period-2 pesos. The robustness of our results to
more general assumptions is explored in the appendix. We show there that
the solvency of banks is no longer independent of the level of the interest
rate, so that a policy of high interest rates may or not dominate a policy of
low interest rates. A policy of high interest rates tends to become more de-
sirable when the maturity mismatch between the peso-denominated assets
and liabilities of banks is less pronounced.
This extension, however, does not invalidate our main conclusion. If the
weight of price stability in domestic objectives is too low and the currency
mismatch is severe, self-fulﬁlling twin crises may exist, and if they do, mone-
tary policy is powerless in preventing them. This is because the scope of mon-
etary policy in preserving banks’ solvency, although no longer completely
empty, remains limited and contingent on exchange rate expectations.
4.4.2 Implications for Exchange Rate Regimes
The recent major twin crises were all associated with ﬁxed but adjustable
currency pegs, whence the natural conclusion that in order to be viable, ex-
change rate regimes have to be either more ﬂexible or more ﬁxed. The ex-
change rate alternative, for emerging economies, is increasingly deﬁned as
a choice between corner solutions—between exchange rate ﬂexibility and
very hard pegs (Eichengreen 1999; Rubin 1999).
In the debate between the extremes, a classical argument in favor of ﬂex-
ibility is that it gives monetary policy more scope to respond to shocks, es-
pecially in times of crisis. However, the apparent margin of maneuver
oﬀered by a ﬂexible exchange rate is largely illusory in our model.16The rea-
son is that the threat is not a currency crisis (a run on the central bank’s for-
eign exchange reserves) but a bank crisis (a run on dollar deposits in banks).
The occurrence of bank runs is determined by the dollar price of future pe-
sos. Whether a given change in this price is achieved by changing the inter-
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16. It is completely illusory under the assumption that D and R1 are equal to zero. It is not
completely illusory, but remains limited, in the more general case (see appendix).est rate or the exchange rate is irrelevant for ﬁnancial stability. Although it
is true that a ﬂoating regime allows the monetary authorities to set a lower
interest rate in the face of speculative pressure, the resulting depreciation
hurts domestic banks no less than high interest rates.
Indeed, if the model has an implication for exchange rate regimes, it is
rather to suggest the optimality of very hard pegs, or dollarization. If the de-
fense of the ﬁxed peg is delegated to a conservative central banker putting
av ery high weight   on exchange rate stability, the bad equilibrium disap-
pears. If, more generally, the domestic authorities ﬁnd a way to make a cred-
ible commitment to exchange rate stability, the vicious spiral that underpins
twin crises is broken, because bank runs no longer feed devaluation expec-
tations. Dollarization can be interpreted as the limit case in which   is inﬁ-
nite, so that there is no exchange rate uncertainty. Twin crises obviously can-
not arise in countries that have dollarized, because then there is no currency
mismatch in the balance sheets of banks: both banks’ assets and liabilities
are denominated in dollars.
This might lead us to conclude in favor of very hard pegs over exchange
rate ﬂexibility. However, this conclusion should be qualiﬁed by two impor-
tant caveats. First, the currency mismatch that is taken as exogenous in the
model could in fact be endogenous to the exchange rate regime. It is often
argued that regimes with ﬁxed but adjustable exchanges are conducive to
currency mismatches because domestic borrowers tend to underestimate
the risk of a devaluation (Lindgren et al. 1999). The model does not capture
one possible beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂexibility—in fact, the only possible
beneﬁt, under our assumptions—which is that it prevents the emergence of
currency mismatches.
The second caveat is that although hard pegs or dollarization remove the
twin crises resulting from currency mismatches in the banking sector—the
crises that we focus on in this paper—they do not remove banking panics à
la Diamond and Dybvig, which result instead from the illiquidity of bank
assets. If bank runs à la Diamond and Dybvig are possible, a group of coun-
tries linked by a system of hard pegs or a common currency may still need
an international lending-of-last-resort arrangement. This is why the reluc-
tance of the U.S. Federal Reserve to assume the role of LOLR abroad may
be viewed as a valid argument against dollarization in Latin American
countries. This is also why the euro area may need an international LOLR.17
4.5 The International Lender of Last Resort
Our model seems to provide an ideal setting for the intervention of an in-
ternational LOLR. Domestic banks are vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling runs be-
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17. See Prati and Schinasi (2000) for a discussion on lending-in-last-resort arrangements in
the euro area.cause the country as a whole lacks international liquidity. Perhaps the bad
equilibrium could be removed by an international LOLR standing ready to
provide the missing international liquidity to the country in the event of a
twin crisis.18
Let us rephrase the question in the context of the model, with some new
notations. Let D∗  D∗(j)djbe the aggregate level of dollar deposits in the
domestic banking sector, X∗the level of foreign exchange reserves at the do-
mestic central bank, and L∗ the dollar endowment of the international
LOLR. The international LOLR could promise to augment the domestic
foreign exchange reserves by lending up to L∗, in which case the domestic
central bank’s access to international liquidity is limited to X∗ L∗in a cri-
sis. Alternatively, the international LOLR could use its resources directly,
without the mediation of the domestic authorities. The question, in both
cases, is how large L∗ should be to remove the bad equilibrium.
Throughout the analysis we require the international LOLR to remove
the bad equilibrium without aﬀecting the good one. In the good equilib-
rium, some banks—the “truly insolvent” ones—are subject to runs (see ﬁg-
ure 4.6). Rescuing these banks, however, is a bailout, not a lending-in-last-
resort operation. Bailing out insolvent banks has costs in terms of moral
hazard ex ante that, although they are not explicitly modeled in our frame-
work, may be important in the real world. As a matter of deﬁnition, it is not
the purpose of a LOLR to bail out insolvent institutions.
4.5.1 A Global Central Bank
Goodfriend and King (1988) argue, in a domestic context, that the
LOLR should inject liquidity into the market by open market operations.19
Lending in last resort, in other words, should involve the same operations
as monetary policy in normal times, although possibly to a much larger
scale. According to this view, lending-in-last-resort policies in which the au-
thorities attempt to bypass the market and target liquidity directly at se-
lected institutions—for example, by lending to them at the discount win-
dow—is a vestige of a time when ﬁnancial markets did not have the depth
and eﬃciency that they have achieved today.
This view is based on the premise that market forces will allocate the liq-
uidity better than the authorities. Market participants have more informa-
tion than the authorities on the situations of individual banks and are not
subject to the temptation of bailing out insolvent banks under political
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18. The lending-in-last-resort arrangement could involve a pool of private banks. However,
there are reasons (outside of the model) that the provision of liquidity by public institutions
may be more eﬀective. In particular, it may be diﬃcult for private banks to commit not to hedge
their risk by market operations that drain international liquidity from the country in the event
of a crisis. A comparison between the various possible types of lending-in-last-resort arrange-
ment is outside the scope of this paper.
19. The origin of this view is sometimes traced back to Thornton ([1802] 1978) and
Humphrey (1975)—see Fischer (2000).pressure. Market forces, thus, will ensure that the liquidity is allocated to
the “truly solvent” banks. Goodfriend and King call this policy “lending-
in-last resort as an input into monetary policy,” as opposed to “lending-in-
last resort as an input into banking policy.”
What should the international LOLRs do, according to this approach?
In the closed-economy context, considered by Goodfriend and King, the
LOLR injects liquidity into the market by open market operations, that is,
by buying bonds in exchange of domestic money. The open-economy ana-
log is an injection of international liquidity, that is, in our model, dollars.
The international LOLR provides international liquidity to the market by
buying peso-denominated bonds in exchange of dollars, that is, by a steril-
ized foreign exchange intervention. If markets are perfectly integrated in-
ternationally, it does not matter whether the foreign exchange intervention
is realized by the international LOLR or by the domestic central bank, or
in which point of the globe the intervention is implemented.
In our model, this approach is completely ineﬀective in removing the bad
equilibrium. Because of UIP, sterilized foreign exchange interventions have
no impact on the interest rate, the exchange rate, or the depositors’ actions.
In particular, every billion dollars that is injected in the market by the do-
mestic central bank simply goes out of the country in capital outﬂows. Do-
mestic foreign exchange interventions, in other words, are immediately
sucked out of the country in capital outﬂows instead of going to the agents
that need foreign liquidity the most, the domestic banks that are subject to
runs.
Our model suggests that if lending in last resort is an input into monetary
policy, then it should be carried out by the center’s monetary authorities (in
the present case in which foreign assets are dollar denominated, the U.S.
Federal Reserve). There are at least two ways in which this statement can be
understood. First, as we already saw, lowering the foreign interest rate, i∗,
may remove the bad equilibrium. Second, the Federal Reserve could suc-
cessfully peg the dollar price of future pesos at the good equilibrium level,
P∗
A. If the dollar price of peso bonds is equal to P∗
A, the number of bank runs
is equal to its good equilibrium level, n A, so that the set of equilibria is re-
duced to the good equilibrium.
In our model, the dollar price of future pesos cannot be pegged at a level
that is inconsistent with UIP. In order to peg this price, the international
LOLR would have to inject dollars in the market until the point when mar-
ket participants can no longer increase their short positions in peso (be-
cause of credit constraints or for other reasons) so that UIP ceases to apply.
This would require an immense liquidity injection at the global scale, which
can be implemented, in practice, only by the issuer of the center currency.
Making international lending in last resort an input in monetary policy thus
vindicates Capie’s (1998) claim that the international LOLR must be the is-
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eral Reserve if the international currency is the dollar.
These results stem, in part, from our assumption that ﬁnancial markets
are perfectly integrated internationally. If ﬁnancial markets were seg-
mented, international liquidity might have a better chance to reach domes-
tic banks if it were injected in the domestic financial market. Uncovered
interest parity also plays a role. In the presence of portfolio eﬀects, the
domestic currency could in principle be strengthened by sterilized foreign
exchange interventions.
Market segmentation is to some extent a policy variable: the domestic au-
thorities can enhance the segmentation of ﬁnancial markets by introducing
capital controls. Although the analysis of capital controls is outside the
scope of this paper, it would be interesting to study whether, and how, cap-
ital controls can remove self-fulﬁlling twin crises in our model. Although
capital controls may prevent depositors from taking their dollar deposits
out of the country, they will not prevent them from running on the domes-
tic banks that they view as insolvent. The solvency of banks in turn results
from the expected exchange rate. Hence, capital controls can remove twin
crises only to the extent that this gives the authorities more scope in inﬂu-
encing exchange rate expectations. This could be the case, for example, if
the controls introduce a wedge in the interest parity condition.
Let us conclude this section with a metaphor—a hydraulic one, as is of-
ten the case in monetary economics. Imagine a small harbor in Brittany: the
tide is low and boats are resting on the bottom of the sea, inside the harbor.
Lending in last resort by injecting liquidity into the market is like trying to
lift the boats by pouring water into the ocean. To be successful, this ap-
proach requires an immense reserve of water (an ability to melt the North
Pole, say). Imagine now that the harbor is separated from the ocean by a
wall and a door. Once the door is closed (capital controls are introduced),
one obviously needs to pour much less liquidity inside the harbor to lift the
boats.
4.5.2 An “International Banking Fund”
We now consider some arrangements in which the international LOLR
can operate as a limited fund. The main diﬀerence from the previous sec-
tion is that the resources of the international LOLR are channeled to the
banks on a case-by-case basis instead of being simply “thrown at the mar-
ket,” in Goodfriend and King’s terminology, the international LOLR pro-
vides an input into banking policy instead of monetary policy. We consider
two arrangements. In the ﬁrst one, the resources of the international LOLR
are used to ﬁnance discount-window lending by the domestic central bank.
In the second one, the international LOLR backs limited guarantees on
dollar deposits at domestic banks.
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ject to runs queue at the discount window of the domestic central bank.20
The latter selects the “truly solvent” banks and lends them all the dollars
they need to repay their depositors. The remaining banks receive nothing
and collapse. It is important to keep in mind that the solvency of banks is
contingent on the equilibrium and that we deﬁne “true” solvency with ref-
erence to the good equilibrium. In other terms, in the bad equilibrium the
authorities assess the solvency of banks as if the economy were in the good
equilibrium. In a banking panic, “true” solvency is an out-of-equilibrium
attribute, not an observable, objective reality.
That banks’ solvency should be assessed with reference to hypothetical
market conditions is consistent with some interpretations of the classical
doctrine of lending in last resort. This is, for example, the way Fischer
(1999) interprets Bagehot’s rule that the LOLR should lend “on any collat-
eral that is marketable in the ordinary course of business when there is no
panic.” The requirement that lending should be made on the basis of the
value of collateral in normal times can be interpreted as taking the good
equilibrium as the benchmark to assess the solvency of banks. In terms of
our model, the authorities must assess the value of banks’ collateral on the
basis of the price that prevails in the good equilibrium, P∗
A. In the bad equi-
librium, P∗
A is a shadow price that is larger than the observed market price,
P∗
C.
It is easy to see that this arrangement reduces the set of equilibria to the
good equilibrium. The international LOLR’s intervention breaks the vi-
cious circle depicted in ﬁgure 4.5 by preventing bank runs from resulting in
an excessive depreciation of the exchange rate. It ensures that the solvent
banks remain in operation and that their balance sheets do not shrink in re-
sponse to runs. For these banks, the only eﬀect of the run is a substitution
of creditors: private depositors are replaced by the central bank. As a result,
there is no credit crunch in the “truly solvent” part of the banking sector,
and the pressure on the exchange rate is reduced accordingly.
The argument can be presented more formally—in terms of the equa-
tions of the model—as follows. Let n Adenote the number of insolvent banks
in the good equilibrium. With discount-window lending, runs on the (truly)
solvent banks no longer contribute to the credit crunch, so that in the
Phillips curve of equation (5) variable n must be replaced by min(n, n A), the
number of insolvent banks that are subject to runs. The equation for the
linkage from bank runs to the exchange rate then becomes
S2   S     
 
 
 f[min(n, n A)] (CC )
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20. This is the way lending in last resort is modeled in Chang and Velasco (2000) and Gold-
fajn and Valdés (1999).In ﬁgure 4.6 the locus (CC) becomes horizontal to the right of point A, im-
plying that the set of equilibria is reduced to the good equilibrium (see ﬁg-
ure 4.7).
The case in which the international LOLR backs a domestic guarantee
on the dollar deposits can be analyzed along similar lines, although there is
an interesting diﬀerence in the economic mechanism involved. The govern-
ment announces that it guarantees deposits at (truly) solvent banks (again,
true solvency is assessed with reference to the good equilibrium). This
breaks the vicious circle depicted in ﬁgure 4.5 by suppressing the linkage
from the currency depreciation to bank runs. The depositors, once insured,
no longer have (strict) incentives to run against the (truly) solvent banks.
The expectation of a depreciation is no longer self-fulﬁlling because it does
not provoke a banking collapse.
In terms of the equations of the model, the guarantee aﬀects the rela-
tionship between the expected exchange rate and the number of bank runs,
equation (4). Developments in the foreign exchange market no longer aﬀect
the (truly) solvent banks, so that equation (4) is replaced by n   min[n A,
N(Se
2)]. The equation for locus (CM) becomes
n   min[n A, N(S2)] (CM )
In figure 4.6 the locus (CM) becomes vertical in point A, so that again the
good equilibrium is the only one (see fig. 4.8). In order for these arrange-
ments to be operational, the resources of the international LOLR do not
need to be larger than the liquidity gap in the domestic banking sector, D∗
– X∗. Indeed, its resources could even be smaller, because the liabilities of
the truly insolvent banks do not have to be covered in the event of a crisis.
This does not seem unrealistically large. As documented in section 4.2,
the IMF-supported rescue packages were of the same order of magnitude
as the liquidity gap in the Asian countries that were most aﬀected by the
crisis.
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Fig. 4.7 Discount-window lendingIn sum, we ﬁnd that an international LOLR backing domestic safety nets
needs much less resources than an international LOLR injecting liquidity
in the market. It can operate as a limited “International Banking Fund”
and would not necessarily need to be considerably larger than existing in-
ternational ﬁnancial institutions. This conclusion, however, ignores one im-
portant aspect of the problem, to which we now turn: agency problems be-
tween the international LOLR and the domestic authorities.
4.5.3 International Agency Problems
One question that we have not addressed so far is the articulation be-
tween the international LOLR and the domestic authorities. To what extent
should the international LOLR rely on the domestic authorities to funnel
the liquidity toward domestic banks? So far, this question has not come up
because we implicitly assumed that the international LOLR and the do-
mestic authorities shared the same objectives. However, the involvement of
two diﬀerent authorities in the international lending-in-last-resort arrange-
ment might give rise to agency problems (Tirole 2001). We discuss in this
section how agency problems might arise in our framework, as well as the
measures to mitigate them.
An agency problem would arise if the domestic authorities thought that
the cost of bailing out the truly insolvent banks could somehow be trans-
ferred to the international community. The domestic authorities would then
be tempted to use the lending-in-last-resort resources in order to bail out
the domestic banks that are insolvent in the good equilibrium, at the ex-
pense of the foreign taxpayers. As argued by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer
(2001), an agency problem could arise even if the ﬁscal cost of the bailout is
borne by the domestic taxpayer. In this case, the problem is that the domes-
tic authorities use the bridge loans from the international community to be
overly generous with the domestic special interests that beneﬁt from the
bailout, at the expense of the domestic taxpayers.
Agency problems could arise at several levels. First, the international
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Fig. 4.8 Guarantee on dollar depositsLOLR might be unable to ensure that its resources were not misused by the
domestic authorities (to bail out insolvent banks). Second, even if the inter-
national LOLR had full control of the way its resources were used—which
would be the case, for example, if it lent directly to domestic banks—it might
not have all the information that is required to use these resources appropri-
ately. Ideally, the international LOLR should be able to assess the “true” sol-
vency of banks in a crisis. This is informationally very demanding: it requires
a precise knowledge of the various feedbacks between the banking system,
the productive sector, and the foreign exchange market, as well as the struc-
ture of banks’ balance sheets.21 In a world where banking supervisory poli-
cies are determined at the national level, most of the relevant knowledge is
the private information of the domestic authorities, and they would have
little incentive to reveal it truthfully to the international LOLR.
There are diﬀerent ways to deal with this agency problem, but they all
seem to require a signiﬁcant involvement of the international LOLR in
banking supervision and safety nets. The international LOLR would have to
be associated with the lending-in-last-resort decisions at the time of the cri-
sis and should be able to form an independent judgment on the true solvency
of banks in a banking crisis. This supposes some access to the information
of the banking supervisors and some assurance that this information is reli-
able. Consequently, the international LOLR would probably have to take an
active role in monitoring domestic banking systems or cooperate closely
with an international agency in charge of international supervision.22
How realistic is this involvement of the international LOLR in the su-
pervision of domestic banking sectors? In spite of eﬀorts to promote in-
ternational standards, the operation of ﬁnancial safety nets and ﬁnancial
oversight policies remains—and will remain for the foreseeable future—
squarely within the bounds of national sovereignty (Eichengreen 1999). Na-
tions remain jealous of their prerogatives in the regulation and supervision
of their banking sectors, and there seems to be little political appetite for a
globally integrated system with the IMF, the BIS, or any new institution at
its center. The domestic resistance to the integration of banking supervision
in the euro area—which is so closely integrated in other respects—gives an
idea of the diﬃculties that would arise at the global level. Ultimately, it is
not clear that a globally integrated system of banking supervision is more
realistic than a global central bank.
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21. As we saw in the previous section, banks’ solvency must be assessed on the basis of an
appropriate shadow price for the collateral. Computing the shadow price is challenging. In
general, there is no reason to presume that the appropriate shadow price is close to the precri-
sis level. In a world where crises are associated with the arrival of news about the fundamen-
tals, the appropriate shadow price should be revised in light of the new information revealed
by (or causing) the crisis.
22. The IMF has recently enhanced its monitoring of domestic banking and ﬁnancial sys-
tems with, for example, the development of its Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP);
see IMF (2001).4.6 Concluding Comments
The main result of this paper should be to instill a solid degree of skepti-
cism regarding the feasibility of an international LOLR without sweeping
institutional reforms. If the international LOLR uses its resources as an in-
put into monetary policy, the model presented here vindicates those who
claim that it must stand ready to provide virtually unbounded amounts of
currency. Central banks satisfy this condition, not any existing interna-
tional ﬁnancial institution. The alternative is an “International Banking
Fund” that is directly involved in the supervision of the domestic banking
systems that it might be called upon to rescue—an institutional arrange-
ment that would also require signiﬁcant reforms in the international ﬁnan-
cial architecture.
An interesting by-product of the paper is an interpretation of the tradeoﬀ
that central banks often face at the time of currency crises. A vigorous in-
terest rate defense weakens the banking system. If banks are fragile, central
banks risk triggering a bank run and may end up with both a currency crash
and a bank collapse. On the other hand, letting the currency go is not a so-
lution either, because this also weakens the banking system by decreasing
the dollar value of its assets. This dilemma explains part of the debate that
has arisen after the Asian crisis between those who favored a vigorous in-
terest rate defense and those who called for a sharp decline in interest rates.
The model presented has a number of microeconomic loose ends. The
special role of banks in ﬁnancial intermediation, which is invoked to justify
the credit crunch term in the Phillips curve, is not explicitly modeled. The
balance sheet eﬀects, which are so important in triggering bank runs in pe-
riod 1, are neglected in period 2. Fixing these loose ends will probably lower
the insight-to-algebra ratio, a price that seems to us worth paying now that
we have taken a panoramic shot of the range of policy issues on which the
model sheds light.
The model also glosses over several important moral hazard issues. This
includes the role of a ﬁxed exchange rate as an implicit guarantee on foreign
borrowing and the eﬀect of a LOLR on risk taking. Finally, it should be
noted that if regulation prohibiting open currency position by banks is
eﬀective, none of our results obtain. Then, however, we would need to take
into account the fact that ﬁrms rarely face such a regulation. If the corpo-
rate sector becomes insolvent, as banks do in our model, and precipitates
bank failures, most of our results stand. However, there are interesting
diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial safety nets, which would be in-
teresting to explore further. It is not so clear that the provision of liquidity
to the banking sector, or government guarantees on banks’ liabilities, would
remove the bad equilibrium if the currency mismatch is in the corporate
sector.
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Data Sources
Foreign exchange reserves: International Financial Statistics, line 1d.
Short-term debt to Bank of International Settlements (BIS) reporting
banks: BIS.
Foreign liabilities of deposit money banks: International Financial Statis-
tics, line 26 c.
Liquidity support to ﬁnancial institutions: author’s computations based on
Lindgren et al. (1999, table 3).
IMF-supported packages (disbursements): author’s computations based
on diﬀerent sources; this variable includes the loans by the IMF, other
multilaterals, and governments; it reﬂects the actual disbursements,
which were lower than the initial commitments.
Bank closures: Lindgren et al. (1999, table 7).
Total assets owned by banks: Lindgren et al. (1999, box 3).
GDP (US$billions): International Financial Statistics, line 99b (Gross Do-
mestic Product, national currency) divided by line rf (exchange rate).
Appendix B
This appendix solves for the equilibria in the general case in which banks
have peso- and dollar-denominated deposits and income streams. The
quantities of peso and dollar deposits at bank j are denoted by D(j)
and D∗(j). Bank j’s  peso-denominated and dollar-denominated income
streams in period t are denoted by Rt(j) and Rt ∗(j).
Using UIP in equation (1) to substitute S1 out of equation (2), the condi-
tion for bank j’s solvency becomes
(A1) D∗(j)   R∗















i∗  {[R1(j)   D(j)](1   i)   R2(j)}
The impact of the interest level on bank j’s solvency depends on the sign of
R1(j) – D(j), which reﬂects the maturity mismatch between assets and lia-
bilities denominated in domestic currency. If R1(j) – D(j)   0, that is, if the
bank has more short-term debt than liquid assets in domestic currency, then
raising the interest rate undermines the bank’s solvency. On the other hand,
if R1(j) – D(j)   0, raising the interest rate enhances the bank’s solvency.
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insolvent banks if R1(j) – D(j)   0 [R1(j) – D(j)   0] for all banks. If the
sign of R1(j) – D(j) diﬀers across banks, then the impact of the interest rate
on the number of insolvent banks is ambiguous. We denote by I(Se
2) the in-
terest level that minimizes the number of insolvent banks when the expected
exchange rate is Se
2, and by N(Se
2) the corresponding number of insolvent
banks.
How does the minimum number of insolvent banks, N(Se
2), vary with the
expected exchange rate? This question is easy to answer if we assume that
all the banks are short in dollars, that is, if the left-hand side of equation
(A1) is positive. Then the set of solvent banks shrinks for anylevel of the in-
terest rate when Se
2 decreases, implying that the minimum number of insol-
vent banks, N(Se
2), is a decreasing function of Se
2.
We deﬁne the rules of the game between the domestic central bank and
the depositors as follows. First, the central bank announces how it will ad-
just the interest rate to the economic conditions, that is, its policy reaction
function i(Se
2). Then depositors play the same Nash game as before, taking
the central bank policy reaction function as given. Depositors still maxi-
mize their expected consumption, and the central bank minimizes its ex-
pected loss Le
2.
Because the central bank’s expected loss is increasing in the number of
bank runs, it optimally announces the policy rule that minimizes the num-
ber of runs, I(Se
2). Given this policy rule, the equilibrium number of runs is
a decreasing function of the expected exchange rate, like before:
n   N(Se
2), N  0.
This equation is the same as equation (4) in the text, and the characteriza-
tion of the equilibria remains the same.
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This is an extremely nice paper. It has two parts, a model of multiple equi-
libria based on maturity/currency mismatch, and a discussion of the role for
a lender of last resort in the context of such multiple equilibria. It has two
important propositions, the ﬁrst about the (near) irrelevance of monetary
policy in the context of banking and currency crises, the second about the
need for directed intervention by the international lender of last resort. Let
me discuss each one in turn.
The Maturity/Currency Mismatch Model
The basic model presented by Jeanne and Wyplosz (JW hereafter) is
beautifully simple. It is based on two relations. The ﬁrst relies on the matu-
rity/currency mismatch of bank liabilities and assets, and it implies a posi-
tive relation between expected depreciation and bank failures. The second
relies on the response of policy to bank failures, and it implies a positive re-
lation between bank failures and expected depreciation. Two positive rela-
tions open the scope for multiple equilibria, including one with high ex-
pected depreciation and high bank failures. This is precisely what the model
generates.
I shall focus in what follows on the ﬁrst of these two relations. First, how-
ever, let me say a few words about the second relation. JW derive it from a
desire by the government, in the face of lower equilibrium output due to
bank failures, to boost demand through inﬂation and, by implication, de-
preciation. This does the trick, but one can think of other channels. More
likely (equally likely?) is a story in which bank failures and a sharp recession
lead to a loss of ﬁscal control, the expectation of higher money growth,
higher inﬂation, and larger depreciation.
Let me turn now to the ﬁrst of the two relations and the eﬀects of interest
rates and the exchange rate on balance sheets.
JW focus in the text on a special case, in which banks have only short-
term dollar liabilities and long-term peso (domestic currency) assets. They
are right to do so, as the results in this case are indeed striking. However,
something is, I think, learned from the more general case (which they work
out in the appendix, except for the presence of long-term liabilities).
Take a bank with both peso and dollar short- and long-term liabilities
(D1, D∗
1, D2, D∗
2), and assets (R1, R∗
1, R2, R∗
2), and consequently with this bal-
ance sheet:
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Asterisks denotes dollar assets or liabilities; 1 and 2 refer to the short and
the long term respectively. Let, as in the paper, S1 and Se
2 be the current and
the future expected exchange rate, expressed in dollars per peso. Then the
net worth of the bank in dollars is given by






 (R2   D2)   S1(R1   D1)
The second term is the value of long-term peso assets minus liabilities,
discounted at the domestic interest rate, and expressed in dollars using the
current exchange rate. The third term is the value of short-term peso as-
sets minus liabilities, again expressed in dollars using the current exchange
rate.












Replacing in the previous equation implies




i∗  (R2   D2)   S1(R1   D1)
In the model presented in the text, R1, D1, and D2are all equal to zero. This
has two implications:
• Because D2 is equal to zero, the second term is an increasing function
of the expected exchange rate. An expected depreciation decreases the
net worth of banks.
• Because both R1 and D1 are equal to zero, the last term is equal to zero.
Because the second term depends neither on the current exchange rate
nor on the current domestic interest rate, then, given  Se
2, the interest
rate–exchange rate mix does not aﬀect the net worth of banks.
This last result is perhaps the most striking result of the JW paper. This
derivation makes clear, however, that it depends on the last term’s being
zero, in other words, a zero short-run position in net domestic assets. If the
condition is not satisﬁed, then monetary policy can improve the net worth
of banks through manipulation of the exchange rate; whether it does this
through a depreciation or an appreciation depends on the sign of the net
position.
What should we expect the sign of (R1– D1) to be in practice? The answer
is far from clear. On the one hand, currency mismatch leads to a small value
120 Olivier Jeanne and Charles Wyploszof D1 (peso liabilities). On the other hand, maturity mismatch leads to a
small value of R1 (short-term peso claims).
This gives some perspective to the result emphasized by JW: it is indeed
special, but there is no obvious bias relative to the general case.
There are other dimensions in which the JW model is special and could
be misleading (JW are not guilty, as the model is just ﬁne for the issues they
focus on). Let me mention a few, more as potential extensions than as crit-
icisms.
First, the model focuses exclusively on the banks’ balance sheets. Thus,
within the logic of the model, one simple way of avoiding crises is for banks
to balance their dollar liabilities with dollar claims, therefore eliminating
the currency mismatch from their balance sheet and removing the possibil-
ity of multiple equilibria.
Although correct in the model, this conclusion is likely to be wrong in
fact: It ignores the fact that the ultimate borrowers are domestic ﬁrms,
which, for the most part, get their revenues in pesos, not in dollars. De-
nominating bank claims in dollars merely transfers the burden from banks
to ﬁrms. After a depreciation, some ﬁrms may not be able to pay back their
dollar liabilities, leading in turn to bank failures.
One should not conclude from this that the denomination of bank claims
is irrelevant. Firms may have deeper pockets than banks after a deprecia-
tion, so that denominating bank claims in dollars rather than pesos may ac-
tually reduce overall ﬁrms’ and banks’ failures. However, the argument
clearly implies that the outcome is likely to depend not only on the banks’
but also on the ﬁrms’ net worth distribution.
Second, one can actually push the logic of the argument one more step:
ﬁrms get their revenues from producing and selling goods. Their peso rev-
enues, and therefore their ability to repay in the future, are likely to vary
with the future price level. This in turn raises the issue of whether, when we
look at the eﬀect of a decrease in Se
2, we are looking at a nominal or at a real
expected depreciation.
To see why this matters, suppose that banks’ claims on ﬁrms are stated
not in pesos but in terms of domestic goods, or, equivalently, that what hap-
pens to the economy depends on the consolidated net worth of banks and
ﬁrms. Let R2now denote revenues in terms of domestic goods and let Pe
2de-
note the expected future price level. In this case, the present value in dollars


















where the equality follows from interest parity. Now assume that purchas-
ing power parity holds in the long term, so the expected depreciation re-
ﬂects higher inﬂation. In the notation of the JW model: Se
2Pe
2   constant.
This in turn implies













The expression is independent of the future expected depreciation, again
breaking the link between expected depreciation and bank failures. Put in
slightly paradoxical terms: rather than making things worse, the maturity
mismatch helps here. Because the claims are long term, and because, in the
long term, purchasing power parity holds, their value in dollars is indepen-
dent of short-term ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate.
Third, to focus on net worth eﬀects, JW rightly choose to ignore issues of
liquidity. Implicitly, they assume that ﬁrms can either liquidate projects for
the present value of the revenues or that they have enough collateral that
they can ﬁnd some other lender if banks call back the loans. Neither as-
sumption is terribly appealing, and it is interesting to think about what hap-
pens when issues of liquidity are reintroduced in the model.
Assume that, if banks call back their long-term peso claims, they get less
than the present value of these claims. Assume further that the larger the
proportion of claims called back, the higher the discount. This opens the
door to two sources of multiple equilibria: ﬁrst, the multiple equilibria that
are the focus of the JW paper, each associated with a diﬀerent value of Se
2;
and, second, for a given Se
2, equilibria with and without runs on the banks.
In standard fashion, a run on banks forces them to call back loans, de-
creasing their net worth, triggering failures, and justifying the run in the
ﬁrst place. Note that the lower Se
2, the lower the net worth of banks in the
good equilibrium, the more likely are multiple equilibria.
There is a potentially interesting twist here (this is speculative, but spec-
ulating is the privilege of the discussant), namely, the interaction between
the two sources of multiple equilibria. For example, in the high Se
2 equilib-
rium, Se
2may be high enough to rule out multiple bank run equilibria. How-
ever, in the low equilibrium, the weakened net worth position of banks may
open the scope for the second type of multiple equilibria, those based on
illiquidity.
Directed Lending by the Lender of Last Resort
The mismatch model allows for a precise discussion of the potential role
for a lender of last resort, and I ﬁnd the point emphasized by JW—namely,
that such international lending should be directed and used to alleviate di-
rectly the currency/maturity mismatch for banks—very convincing and
very important. Let me elaborate on two issues here.
I am less worried about moral hazard problems than the authors appear
to be. I believe that lending by the international lender of last resort should
be to the government, not to the banks themselves, and I do not see why the
international lender has to involve itself in the details of domestic bank su-
pervision.
In another paper, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) have shown that such
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ternational taxpayers. If the government is benevolent (i.e., it cares prima-
rily about domestic taxpayers), then it will indeed want to use the funds for
directed lending to banks, or to honor guarantees on dollar-denominated
debt. Separating potentially solvent from insolvent banks will entail the
usual amount of guesswork and mistakes. However, it is not clear why and
how international lending to the government makes this worse.
If the government is not benevolent, but is instead captured by the banks
or some of the debtor ﬁrms, then it will indeed misbehave. However, it will
typically do so whether or not it can borrow from the international lender.
It is not clear why, conditional on the government’s having to repay the
funds lent by the international lender, access to such funds will lead to a
worse outcome.
I am more worried, however, about the generality of the directed-lending
result. 
Consider another example of multiple equilibria, which also opens the
case for a potential intervention by a lender of last resort. Forget banks.
Take a European Monetary System-type crisis, in which the currency is
pegged. An attack on the currency, which requires high interest rates, leads
to a recession and forces a devaluation, which in turn justiﬁes the attack. In
this case, it is not clear to which institutions, if any, the funds should be di-
rected. For the reasons given in the paper, this makes intervention by a
lender of last resort much more diﬃcult and thus, other things being equal,
less appealing.
This, in turn, raises at least two issues: ﬁrst, whether the nature of actual
crises is suﬃciently identiﬁable that, in practice, the international lender
can assess whether directed lending will work—justifying intervention—or
not, in which case it may not want to lend; second, whether the nonmis-
match multiple equilibria we can think of all rely, as is the case above, on the
defense of a ﬁxed exchange rate. (All those I could think of did). If the an-
swer is yes, then, under ﬂoating rates, the mismatch example that is the fo-
cus of the paper may be the typical case, in which case directed lending, and
intervention by the international lender, can indeed be the solution.
Reference
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Discussion Summary
Martin Feldstein inquired why, if the IMF has to go in and be a supervisor
at the local level, it cannot lend directly to the government.
Morris Goldstein inquired whether the risk is even bigger when there are
The International Lender of Last Resort 123both bank and corporate mismatches. He also noted that the model’s results
are invariant to the exchange rate regime only if the regime in place is not
relevant to the balance sheet mismatch. Supposedly, a ﬂoating regime can
deter the creation of this mismatch in the ﬁrst place.
Jeﬀrey Shaferquestioned the “interest rates don’t matter” conclusion. He
mentioned the Mexico crisis as a case in which the interest rate played a key
role when policy tightened and the money supply was restricted.
Robert P. Flood questioned whether UIP couldn’t hold in this model.
Peter B. Kenenstated that, even with a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, gov-
ernment debt is still a major problem. Thus, not only bank debt matters.
Olivier Jeanne’s model, he noted, corresponds to the Meltzer commission’s
view of the world. However, because the IMF lends money to the govern-
ment and not the banks that are experiencing a mismatch crisis, there is a
principal-agent problem involved. Then, an international supervisor of na-
tional supervisors is needed.
Stijn Claessens inquired whether the model implied that the lender-of-
last-resort (LOLR) function is only relevant for twin crises, and asked if the
model implies that an LOLR is not helpful in a classical balance-of-
payments crisis.
Andrew Berg pointed to portfolio balanced eﬀects and their conse-
quences for stabilization programs when capital is mobile. He also ques-
tioned the relevance of the model to the Mexican crisis, as investors were
ﬂeeing all banks, not only some subset with weaker fundamentals.
Michael P. Dooleyinquired whether a LOLR could function if it does not
have the power to nationalize the banking industry.
Barry Eichengreen asked whether the banks would not be able to borrow
abroad when hit by a liquidity crisis, given the assumptions of the model,
and whether this left any need for a LOLR.
Olivier Jeanne’s response focused ﬁrst on the applicability of the model to
the LOLR function. He noted that whether the mismatch is in the banking
or corporate sector (or both) is not a problem as long as by lending to banks
the LOLR solves the problem. He then, in response to Eichengreen’s com-
ment, noted that in the bad equilibrium banks are really insolvent and can-
not borrow abroad—provided they had a currency mismatch in the ﬁrst
place. He also remarked that it is not easily seen why domestic governments
cannot supply the LOLR function. An international LOLR faces a moral
hazard problem in its relationship with the domestic authorities. It may
need, as a result, to supervise the domestic supervisors—which is possible,
in practice, only if it does some supervising of banks directly. He concluded
by noting that the result that “the interest rate does not matter in a crisis”
corresponds to an interesting but special case of the model. In general the
interest rate matters. It could matter, furthermore, for reasons that are not
in the model. For example, in a signaling framework (such as Drazen’s), the
government could raise the interest rate in order to signal its type.
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